Contamination of Persian Gulf War Veterans and Others by Depleted Uranium

 Introduction: The Testimony of Physicist Leonard A. Dietz

By Dennis Kyne, decorated Desert Storm combat veteran, cum laude graduate of San Jose State University (1995). Dennis has testified in Hamburg, Germany, and in Japan on the effects of low-level radiation on the gene pool.

Dennis Kyne, Leuren Moret and Major Doug Rokke. Palo Alto 2003

What follows is the testimony of Leonard A. Dietz, a retired physicist from the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. He submitted it to the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee in June 1997, during hearings on Gulf War Syndrome. It is technical, so here is what it says in plain terms.

When a depleted uranium (DU) round hits armor, or when DU burns, part of it turns into a fine, invisible dust of uranium oxide. Dietz explains that these particles are small enough to stay airborne for hours and travel on the wind for miles. He knew this firsthand. In 1979, he and his colleagues found DU particles in air filters as far as 26 miles from a plant in upstate New York that made DU munitions.

Once breathed in or swallowed, this dust can settle in the lungs and spread to organs and bones. It stays there, giving off radiation for years. Dietz points out that the radiation comes not only from the uranium itself but also from the elements it naturally decays into. These give off beta and gamma radiation that can pass through many body cells and damage genetic material.

Hundreds of tons of DU were fired in Kuwait and Iraq. Dietz argues that if even a small share of it burned, thousands of kilograms of this dust would have drifted over the battlefield. Unprotected troops would have breathed it in. At the time, the military’s position was that DU risks were acceptable in combat. Few veterans were ever tested.

Dietz closes by calling for a full health study of Gulf War veterans and their children. He says it should be carried out by independent scientists, completely separate from the Defense Department and the VA.

Note: This text was scanned from the original, and some typos from that process remain.

Full testimony of Leonard A. Dietz, House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, June 26, 1997.

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 5906 words

TESTIMONY June 26, 1997, LEONARD A. DIETZ

PHYSICIST AND RESEARCH SCIENTIST (RETIRED)

HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT HUMAN RESOURCES

GULF WAR SYNDROME

Contamination of Persian Gulf War Veterans and Others by Depleted Uranium

Source: Leonard A. Dietz, physicist and research scientist (retired), Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. Contamination of Persian Gulf War Veterans and Others by Depleted Uranium (July 19, 1996).

Submitted as testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on Human Resources, hearing on Gulf War Syndrome, June 26, 1997.

Originally published by the WISE Uranium Project, now at wise-uranium.org. For more on depleted uranium and the Gulf Wars, see wise-uranium.org/dissgw.html.

Shared by Dennis Kyne, Desert Storm veteran.

Abstract

We develop background information about depleted

uranium (DU) and use it to describe a physical model

of how on the battlefields in Kuwait and Iraq a large

number of unprotected Gulf War veterans could easily

have acquired dangerous quantities of DU in their

bodies.

We examine how U-238, which comprises more than 99% of

DU, decays radioactively, producing two decay progeny

that are always present with it and add significantly

to its radioactivity. The pyrophoric nature of uranium

metal causes it to bum (oxoize rapidly) when heated by

impact or in fires to form invisible aerosol particles

that become airborne.

We refer to scientific measurements that have been

made of the atmospheric wind-borne transport of

uranium aerosols over distances up to 25 miles (42 km)

from their sources. Stokes’ well-known physical law

helps to explain how airborne transport of DU

particles can occur over large distances.

We describe how gamma rays and energetic beta

particles become absorbed in body tissue and can

traverse large numbers of body calls, potentially

causing damage to genetic material in the nuclei of

living cells.

We describe a biokinetic model developed by the

International Commission on Radiation Protection that

explains how uranium microparticles can enter the body

and spread to vital organs. The model predicts that an

acute intake of uranium particles can result in

urinary excretions of uranium for years afterward.

We review estimates of the tonnage of DU munitions

fired during the Gulf War. Even it only one or two

percent of a low estimate of 300 metric tons of DU

fired burned up, this would have Produced 3000–6000 kg

of DU aerosols.

This background information allows us to propose a

plausible contamination model at a battle site. It

consists of three steps:

1. A source of hundreds of kilograms of DU aerosols

generated suddenly against concentrated Iraqi armor;

2. Widespread rapid dispersal of DU aerosol particles

by wind action;

3. Inhalation and ingestion of DU particles by

unprotected U.S. service personnel on the battlefield.

The U.S. military and its representatives claim that

DU munitions are safe, but they have not publicly

addressed health and safety issues that apply after DU

munitions have bow fired. Apparently the official view

is that in a combat situation it is acceptable for

unprotected personnel to be exposed to the combustion

products of fired DU munitions and assume any health

risks involved.

We mention that 22 U.S. service personnel have been

reported to have suffered imbedded fragments of DU in

their bodies from “friendly, fire.” More than 5 years

after the Gulf War, few of these fragments have been

removed and the long-term health situation for these

veterans has not yet been determined. We note the

astonishingly high incidence of serious birth defects

in families of Gulf War veterans in the State of

Mississippi.

Finally, we mention how commonly used DU flight

control counterweights in aircraft and DU munitions

can bum in intense tires and produce dangerous

concentrations of airborne DU aerosol particles that

can be inhaled and ingested.

Introduction

It has been reported widely in the press that numerous

Persian Gulf War veterans have become ill with with

Gulf War Syndrome. During the war they were exposed to

toxic chemicals, experimental drugs, insect repellents

and depleted uranium or DU (Ref. 1). Uranium is known

to be highly toxic both chemically and radiologically

(Ref. 2).

It has not yet been determined to what degree DU may

have caused their illnesses and genetic detects in

their children conceived and born after the war. Few

veterans were aware that DU munitions were used until

after they were exposed to uranium and became ill.

Some were told about the gamma emission from DU but no

one was told about the health dangers of inhaling tine

particles of uranium oxide dust generated when a DU

penetrator hits armor (Ref. 3). Eight days after the

shooting stopped, a directive from Army Headquarters

gave the first instructions to troops on how to treat

radioactively contaminated vehicles (Ref. 4).

The main purpose of this paper is to develop a

physical model of how easily marry Gulf War veterans

could have acquired dangerous quantities of DU in

their bodies. To accomplish this we review the

pyrophoric nature of uranium metal and its

radioactivity. We show how readily uranium aerosol

dust can be transported great distances by wind action

in the atmosphere, pathways that DU aerosol particles

can take into the body and become absorbed, and the

tonnage of DU munitions fired during the Gulf War.

This information is used to construct a contamination

model that explains how large numbers of soldiers very

likely became contaminated on the battlefields in

Kuwait and Iraq. We show how the U.S. military views

the safety of DU munitions, and we close by mentioning

some of the known exposures of U.S. soldiers to DU and

noting the high percentage of severe birth defects in

children conceived and born in many families of Gulf

War veterans.

The Pyrophoric Nature of Uranium Metal

The pyrophoric nature of uranium metal is well known

(Re. 2, Rel. 5). An estimate used by U.S. Army field

commanders is that when a DU penetrator in a cannon

round is fired at high velocity against armor, about

10% of R bums up and forms micrometer-size uranium

oxide particles that can be inhaled or ingested (Ref.

6). However, a report by the Army Environmental Policy

Institute (AEPI) describing research an hard target

testing states “As much as 70 percent of a DU

penetrator can be aerosolized when it strikes a tank.

..” (Ref. 7).

Uranium can burn in other ways to generate aerosol

particles of uranium oxide. Because elemental uranium

is pyrophoric, when DU metal is heated in air at a

temperature of 500 deg. C it can oxidize rapidly and

sustain slow combustion (Ref. 5). For example the

effects of fires at storage sites for DU munitions

have been studied (Rot. 8). The burning of DU metal

flight control counterweights at airplane crash sites

and the possibility of exposing large numbers of

people to kidney poisoning (nephrotoxicity) by uranium

oxide particles has been studied by Parker (Ref. 9).

In 1992 an B Al Boeing-747 crashed into an apartment

building in Amsterdam, Holland and burned intensely.

Approximately 273 kg of DU in the tail of the 747 is

unaccounted for; it burned and contaminated the

surrounding area (Ref. 10).

Radioactive Decay of Uranium

We look briefly at the uranium decay series. Table I

summarizes the isotopic composition of natural and

depleted uranium. The isotopic compositions were

measured in highly sensitive and accurate mass

spectrometers at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory

(Ref. 11).

Table I. isotopic composition of natural and

depleted uranium in

atom percent.

U-234 U-235 U-236

U-238

Natural Uranium 0.0055 0.7196 0.0000

99–2749

Depleted Uranium 0.0008 0.2015 0.0030

99–7947

A trace of U-236 from reprocessed nuclear fuel may be

present in some of the DU stockpile. The alpha

activity in DU is about 431% less than it is in

natural uranium because there is km U-234 and U-235,

but DU always occurs in highly concentrated form and

this more than makes up for its lower alpha activity.

In contrast, natural uranium occurs in concentrations

of 1–3 parts per million by weight in soils, where it

is locked up in non-metallic form in minerals and is

relatively inert to chemical action there.

Only the first three isotopes in the uranium decay

series or chain headed by U-238 are important in

determining the radioactivity of DU (Ref. 12).

Uranium-238 decays into thorium-234 (Th-234), which

decays into protactinium-234 (Pa-234), which decays

into U-234, etc. down the decay chain. The 246,000

year half life of U-234 is too long for it to decay

much during our lifetimes and produce significant

numbers of decay progeny.

The U-238 decay chain is broken during the chemical

reduction of uranium hexafluoride into DU metal and is

broken again during the melting and processing of the

metal into a penetration To determine the maximum time

it takes to regain equilibrium in the partial decay

chain, we assume a solid sample of uranium that

initially contains only the U,-238 isotope, i.e. no

decay progeny. Using Bateman’s equations, (Ref. 13).

we calculate the growth of Th-234 and Pa-234

activities as a function of elapsed time in weeks. The

results are given in Table II.

Table II. Radioactivity (disintegrations/second)

in I gram of U-

238 with no decay progeny initially present. Hag

lives used: U-238 =

4.47e9 years; Th-234 = 24.10 days; Pa-234 =1.17

minutes, 6.69 hours

(two decay states); U-234 = 2.4695 years (Ref — 14).

Scientific

notation is used, i.e. 2.46e5 = 246000.

Weeks U-238 -> Th-234 -> Pa-234 -> U-234

0 12,430 0 0 0.000

1 12,430 2,270 2,150 0.000

5 12,430 7,890 7,840 0.001

10 12,430 10,770 10,750 0.004

15 12,430 11,830 1,820 0.007

20 12,430 12,210 12,210 0.010

25 12,430 12,350 12,350 0.013

30 12,430 12,400 12,400 0.017

After 25 weeks, Th-234 and Pa-234 have reached 99.4%

of the decay rate of U-238 and for practical purposes

have reached secular equilibrium with U-238, their

parent isotope. Secular equilibrium means that the

decay progeny of U-238 are being replaced at the same

rate they are decaying; attar 25 weeks ail three

isotopes are decaying at approximately the same rate.

This is a maximum time; in reality, equilibrium will

be readied much taster, since these two isotopes can

never be separated totally from U-238. The isotope

U-238 emits alpha particles and also emits some gamma

rays. Its decay progeny Th-234 and Pa-234 each emit

beta particles and gamma rays. An alpha particle is a

fast helium am with its two elections removed, a beta

particle is a high-speed electronic and a gamma ray is

like an X-ray.

From this analysis we conclude that in solid sample of

DU, six months at most after manufacture of a DU

penetrator, or DU armor for a tank, or DU particles in

a person’s body, substantial additional radiation in

the form of beta particles and gamma rays always win

be present. In fact, most of the penetrating gamma

radiation and all of the penetrating beta radiation

from DU comes, not from uranium, but from the decay

progeny of U-238 (Ref. 15). In a year, only one-

thousandth of a gram (1 milligram or mg) of DU

generates more than a billion alpha particles, beta

particles and gamma rays.

The U.S. Army has investigated the generation of DU

aerosol in armored vehicles hit by DU cannon rounds.

Their investigators report …that personnel inside DU

stuck vehicles could receive a dose in the ‘tens of

milligrams’ range due to inhalation” (Ref. 16). This

exposure results in an acute dose of uranium.

Gamma rays become absorbed in body tissue as follows.

If their energy exceeds 40 keV, part of the gamma-ray

energy is transferred to an atomic electron, selling

it in high-speed motion (1 keV = 1000 electron volts

energy). The remaining energy is carried off by a new

gamma ray. This process, called the Compton effect,

repeats until the gamma ray has an energy below about

40 keV where the photoelectric effect dominates and

the remaining energy can be transferred to a

photoelectron.

For example, using Gofman’s method,(Ref. 17) one can

calculate that an 850 keV gamma ray absorbed in body

tissue will produce a packet of high-speed Compton

electrons and a fast photolectron that on average can

traverse 137 body calls. BY contrast, according to

Gofman, X-rays commonly used in medical diagnosis have

a peak energy of 90 keV and an average energy of 30

keV (Bet. 17) A 30 keV X-ray in body tissue can be

converted into a photoelectron of this energy, which

on average can traverse only 1.7 calls. Ionization

along the tracks of high-speed electrons in tissue can

cause damage to genetic material in the nuclei of

cells.

Thus, a high energy gamma ray from Pa-234 is much more

penetrating than a typical medical X-ray and can

damage tar more living cells. The many 2.29 MeV beta

particles emitted by Pa-234 are extremely penetrating

in body tissue (1 MeV = I million election volts

energy). Referring to the experimental data given by

Gofman (Ref. 17), each one of these beta particles can

traverse more than 500 body calls.

Alpha, beta and gamma radiations produce the same

biological effects on cells and organs, and much of

their radiation damage to body tissue can accumulate

over the time of exposure (Ref. 18). Therefore, it

seems reasonable that not only to continuous radiation

of body tissue by alpha particles from U-238, but the

energetic beta particles and gamma rays from its decay

progeny Th-234 and Pa-234 must also be considered when

assessing possible cancer risk and genetic damage.

Airborne Transport of Uranium Particles

The fallout range of airborne DU aerosol dust is

virtually unlimited. These micro-particles can be

Inhaled and ingested easily and that makes them

dangerous to human health. Environmental assessments

for sites which process DU or test tire DU munitions

typically downplay the potential for widespread

fallout of DU particles.

For example, one such environmental impact study in

1992 by the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory

(Ref. 19) states, “Because of the mass and density of

the DU particle, it only travels short distances when

airborne. These two factors alone preclude the

off-site release of DU.” This is not true for

micrometer size particles at uranium metal or its

oxides. In tact, the transport of airborne DU aerosol

particles was well known long before the Army

Ballistics Research Laboratory environmental impact

study was written, since in 1976 it had been measured

up to a distance of 8 km (Ref. 20). What my not have

been fully appreciated in 1976 was that DU aerosol

particles could be transported by wind action over

much greater distances.

In 1979 the author worked at the Knolls Atomic Power

Laboratory (KAPL) in Schenectady, New York. While

trouble shooting a radiological problem, he and his

colleagues in the mass spectrometer component

accidentally discovered DU aerosols collected in

environmental air filters exposed at the Knolls site

(Ref. 21). The origin of the DU contamination proved

to be the National Lead Industries plant in Colonie,

10 miles (16 km) east of the Knolls site, on the

western boundary of the city of Albany, NY. A local

newspaper reported that NL was fabricating DU

penetrators for 30-mm cannon rounds and airplane

counterweights made of DU metal (Ref. 22).

A total of 16 air filters at three different locations

covering 25 weeks of exposure from May through October

of 1979 were analyzed; all contained trace amounts of

DU. Three of these air filters were exposed for four

weeks each at a site 26 miles (42 km) northwest of the

NL plant. This is by no means the maximum fallout

distance for DU aerosol particles.

Totally unrelated to the discovery of DU in KAPL air

filters, in February 1980, a court order by NY State

forced NL to cease production, because they exceeded a

NY State radioactivity limit of 150 microcuries for

airborne emissions in a given month (Ref. 22). The

plant closed in 1983 and is now being decontaminated

and dismantled. The 150 microcuries corresponds to 387

g of DU metal. For comparison, one GAU-8/A penetrator

in an aircraft 30-mm cannon round contains 272 g of DU

metal (Ref. 5).

Using a special fission track analysis technique, 26

uranium- bearing particles were extracted from several

air filters exposed at KAPL and were analyzed

separately for their uranium isotopic content (Ref.

11) Four particles contained pure DU. They were

approximately 4- 6 micrometers in size, three were

irregularly shaped and the fourth was a 3.8 micrometer

diameter sphere. Probably it solidified from a molten

state as uranium dioxide. The other 22 particles were

enriched uranium associated with the radiological

troubleshooting problem.

This widespread trace contamination of DU in the

atmosphere was less than one percent of allowable

limits. Its presence in the air filters did not

concern us nearly as much as the sizes of the DU

particles that were born ten miles by the wind from

Albany to KAPL. The four DU particles were near the

upper and of the respirable size range, which is about

5 micrometers. Respirable means that particles will

pass through the upper respiratory airway to the lung

and become deposited in various interior regions of

the king, where many will remain for many years. A 5

micrometer uranium dioxide particle can cause a high,

localized yearly radiation dose from energetic alpha

particles to lung tissue; it is a radioactive hot spot

in the king (Ref. 23).

The density of uranium metal is 19 grams per cubic

centimeter; for uranium dioxide it is 11 grams per

cubic centimeter, equal to the density of lead. How

can a uranium dioxide particle with this density, or a

uranium metal particle with a density 1.7 times that

of lead remain airborne long enough to be transported

by wind 26 miles (42 km)? It might seem a daunting

challenge to answer this question, but a complicated

physical theory is unnecessary.

Just as a parachute jumper in a tree tall through the

lower atmosphere quickly reaches a constant terminal

velocity of approximately 120 mph, so too a

micrometer-size uranium particle falling under

gravitational attraction through still air will reach

a constant terminal velocity that is determined by its

size, density, geometrical shape and air viscosity.

Stokes’ law provides an accurate and convincing

scientific explanation of how micrometer-size DU

particles can remain airborne for many hours. This

physical law is well known to scientists and engineers

who study fluid dynamics. It was published in 1846 and

1851 by Sir George Stokes, and is described in

introductory textbooks on fluid flow (Ref. 24). It is

given by the expression Charter Deleted where

9C

R¬2 means R squared,

G= 980.4 centimeters per second squared is the

acceleration of gravity,

R = the radius of the sphere in centimeters,

S = the density of the sphere in grams per cubic

centimeter,

A = 1.213e-3 grams per cubic centimeter is to density

of air at one atmosphere and 18 dog. C,

C = 1.827e-4 poise is the viscosity of air at one

atmosphere and 18 deg. C.

The terminal velocity V is in centimeters per second

if G, R, S, A and C are in the units shown. Stokes’

law allows one to calculate the terminal velocity of a

microsphere of uranium metal or uranium oxide of known

radius and density falling through still air.

Stokes’ law is valid for fluid flow described by a

Reynolds number of 0. 1 or less (Ref. 24). Experiments

confirm this upper limit (Ref. 25) The dimensionless

Reynolds number Re for a sphere is given by 2 RAV,

Re =

C

where the terms are defined above. A 10 micrometer

diameter uranium metal sphere falls at 5.7 cm/sec in

still air and Re = 0.038, which is much less than 0.1.

Therefore, Stokes’ law is accurate for WI respirable

spherical uranium metal or oxide particles 10

micrometers or less in diameter failing through air.

Table III fists the fall rates for a range of particle

sizes.

Table III. Terminal (constant) velocities for

uranium dioxide

spherical particles in still air.

Diameters are in micrometers.

dia cm/sec. ft/hr.

5.0 0.82 97

4.0 0.52 62

3.0 0.30 35

2.0 0.13 15

1.0 0.033 4

0.5 0.0082 1

Irregularly-shaped microparticiles will fall more

slowly than a sphere of the same density and weight.

Depleted uranium particles one micrometer or smaller

are virtually floating in air and can remain airborne

for a very long time. The 3.8 micrometer dia.

spherical uranium dioxide particle analyzed at KAPL

had a fall rate of 56 ft./hr. It had to reach a height

of only 200 ft. in the warm exhaust plume from the

National Lead plant for a gentle breeze averaging 3

mph to carry it 10 miles (16 km) to KAPL.

Fallout range can be increased greatly by two more

natural phenomena. First, frictional forces in the air

or emission of an alpha particle from a uranium atom

wig electrostatically charge a DU particle. For

example, N is well known that a high velocity ion

striking a metal oxide surface will dislodge a pulse

of secondary electrons from the surface (Ref. 26).

An alpha particle is a high velocity helium ion, and

it will generate a large number of secondary electrons

below the surface of an uranium oxide particle as it

passes through the surface. Many of the

momentarily-free electrons just below the surface will

escape from an airborne uranium oxide particle,

leaving it in a positively- charged state.

Like an electrostatic precipitator collecting dust in

a room, an electrically-charged uranium dioxide

particle and an oppositely- charged dust particle will

attract each other and join together. The average

density of the two particles together will be

substantially less than 11 grams per cubic centimeter

and the fallout range will be greatly increased.

Fallout particles of DU also can become attached to

sand or dust particles on the ground and then become

resuspended in the air by wind or vehicle action and

transported to new locations (Ref. 27). Desert sand in

the Persian Gulf region is extremely fine (Ref. 28).

Second, random motions of the atmosphere of a few

cm/sec are of the same order of magnitude as the

terminal velocities of micrometer particles of DU

oxide or metal tailing through air.

Pathways of DU and Its Radiations Into the Body

Routes of intake or pathways of uranium particles into

the body include the respiratory tract, the

gastrointestinal tract and the skin, through abrasions

or wounds. The International Commission on Radiation

Protection (ICRP) has developed a biokenetic model

that describes the behavior of uranium within the

human body (Ref. 29). The model takes into account

aerosol particle size, chemical form, and the

excretion rates of absorbed uranium from individual

vital organs and bones. Radioactive particles reach

the gastrointestinal tract by ingestion and by

transfer from the respiratory tract. The model shows

that for an acute intake of uranium aerosol particles

of uranium dioxide or U308, urinary excretion of the

inhaled uranium can continue for years.

Exposure to gamma rays emitted from DU is another

pathway into the body. Crews are exposed to the

equivalent of one chest X-ray for every 20–30 hours

they spend in an Abrams tank armed with DU ammunition

(Ref. 30). The U.S. Army measured a gamma dose rate of

250 millirems per hour at the surface of a penetrator

(Ref. 31). This dose rate is consistent with the 233

millirads per hour dose rate for an unspecified mass

of DU listed on a U.S. Department of Labor Material

Safety Data Sheet issued to Nuclear Metals, Inc. (Ref.

32). For gamma rays, the rad and rem dose units are

equal. At body contact, the 250 millirems per hour is

equivalent to a dose rate of up to approximately 50

chest X — rays per hour. Whole penetrators or large

fragments of penetrators fired from tank cannon and

left on a battlefield have this amount of surface

radioactivity.

Estimates of Tonnage of DU Munitions Fired

The actual tonnage of DU munitions tired during the

Gulf War is difficult to ascertain. During the war all

battlefield news was censored and the expenditure of

DU by A-10 attack aircraft was classified (Rot. 33).

It has been estimated that these aircraft fired about

950/6 of the DU munitions used during Desert Shield

and Desert Storm (Ref. 34). The U.S. Army now claim

(Ref. 35) that “More than 14,000 large caliber DU

rounds were consumed during Operations Desert

Shield/Desert Storm. As many as 7,000 of these rounds

may have been fired in practice. Approximately 4,000

rounds were reportedly fired in combat. The remaining

3,000 rounds are losses that include a substantial

loss in a fire at Doha, Kuwait.

The 14,000 rounds contained about 60 metric tons of

DU. William Arkin estimates from documents released

under the Freedom of Information Act that

approximately 300 metric tons of DU littered the

battlefields of Kuwait and Iraq after the war (Ref.

34). The LAKA Foundation estimates the total as SM

tons (Ref. 36). Allowing for DU projectiles missing

their targets, even it only one or two percent of the

lower estimate of 300 metric tons burned up, then

3,000,000- 6,000,000 grams of DU aerosol particles

could have become airborne over the battlefields -a

huge amount.

Contamination Model

We can now propose a plausible model of how veterans

became contaminated with DU during the Gulf War. It

consists of a sequence of three steps:

1. Source-in a local area of a battlefield, hundreds

of kilograms of micrometer-size DU particles were

generated suddenly by cannon fire from U.S. airplanes

and tanks at concentrated formations of Iraqi armor.

Thermal columns from burning tanks and vehicles then

carried aloft these localized plumes of DU aerosol

particles.

2. Dispersal-Clouds of DU aerosol particles were

dispersed far and wide by wind action over the

battlefield arid, based on the KAPL measurements, the

fallout range of these uranium micro-particles could

be tip to 25 miles (42 km) or more (Ref. 11).

3. Inhalation and Ingestion-unprotected U.S. service

personnel could inhale and ingest huge numbers of DU

particles into their lungs and bodies, where much of

the DU could become absorbed in vital organs and

bones. The ICRP biokinetic model explains how uranium

aerosol particles can enter the body and become

absorbed (Ref. 29).

The U.S. Army and the Department of Veterans Affairs

have shown an unwillingness to investigate health

issues associated with the toxicity and radioactivity

of inhaled and ingested DU aerosol particles that have

become absorbed in the body. Both have refused to test

large numbers of veterans for the presence of DU in

their bodies; so far only a handful have been tested.

According to Laura Flanders, as of January, 1995, at

least 45,000 soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf

during the war are suffering from symptoms connected

with their service (Ref. 37).

Workers in DU industrial processing plants and people

living in communities surrounding these plants also

have been contaminated by fallout of DU particles

(Ref. 22). How rapidly contamination takes place

depends on the magnitude of the airborne concentration

and particle size of the uranium dust. The smaller the

particle, the easier R can enter the body.

In written testimony prepared for a 1982 New York

State hearing on NL Industries, Dr. Cad Johnson, a

principal investigator of the National Cancer

Institute Project, stated that some of the workers at

the NL plant had concentrations of uranium in their

urine as high as 30 picocuries/liter (77 micrograms of

urank/liter). He said this concentration level

indicated a very heavy body burden of uranium (Ref -

38).

How the U.S. Military Views the Safety of DU Munitions

In a letter to Senator Sam Nunn, a representative of

the U.S. Air Force stated, “..these Projectiles are no

more hazardous to store, transport, or employ than

those composed of lead or copper’ (Ref. 39). This view

is echoed in the U.S. Army report to Congress that

states, “The health risks associated with using DU in

peacetime are minimal. This includes risks associated

with transporting, storing and handling intact DU

munitions and affnor during peacetime” (Ref — 40).

Neither the Air Force nor the Army has publicly

presented an analysis of the health risks to soldiers

and to others who inhale or ingest radioactive fallout

particles of DU, or the health risks of living in an

environment contaminated with DU after these munitions

have been fired-these are the real safety issues they

ignore. Furthermore, a General Accounting Office

report to Congress states, “…Army officials believe

that DU protective methods can be ignored during

battle and other life-threatening situations because

DU-related health risks are greatly outweighed by the

risks of combat” (Ref. 41).

The Army must know that it would be extremely

difficult to provide breathing masks that can

efficiently remove all of the respirable DU particles

from air breathed by soldiers. Even it highly

efficient air titters are used by troops, their

surroundings will still be contaminated. The surface

of the ground, vegetation, equipment, uniforms and

other garments contaminated with DU particles will

become secondary sources of airborne DU aerosols

whenever they are disturbed or moved, thereby

presenting an insurmountable radiological containment

and decontamination problem on the battlefield.

In the AEPI report, (Ref. 42) the Army judges it an

acceptable risk it its personnel become exposed in an

unprotected fashion to the combustion products of

fired DU munitions on the battlefield or elsewhere.

This report contains much technical information about

DU, but many of the assertions and conclusions in the

report are not supported by the technical and

scientific data presented. A rebuttal to the AEPI

report pointing out some major inconsistencies in the

Army report has been published by the Military Toxics

Project (Ref. 43).

Exposure of U.S. Soldiers and Illnesses in Their

Families

Thirty-six U.S. soldiers, including 22 with embedded

fragments of DU in their bodies, have sought or

reported for medical treatment (Ref. 44). They were in

vehicles hit by DU munitions. Another report states

there were 35 casualties and 72 wounded in crews of

U.S. tanks and Bradley Fighting vehicles in so-called

“friendly fire” incidents (Ref. 45). This includes the

36 above and is the total number of service personnel

officially admitted to have been exposed to

significant quantifies of DU aerosol dust and DU

fragments during the fighting.

On an NBC Dateline program, (Ref. 6) Sgt. Daryll Clark

describes how he and twelve others were in an advanced

position in the desert when someone radioed them that

20 Iraqi tanks were approaching his forward radar unit

He called for air support, and shortly a flight of

A-10 Warthogs arrived and destroyed all of the tanks

with DU-Upped 30- mm cannon rounds.

Clark describes how he and the men with him were

coughing and choking on smoke from the burning tanks,

but mixed with R was DU aerosol dust which he and the

others breathed. He has had chronic respiratory

problems since the war and his daughter Kennedy was

born in September 1992 with purple welts called

hemangioma covering not only her face and body, but

some internal organs as well. Kennedy has serious

breathing problems and was born without a thyroid.

Clark stated that a geneticist told him that he could

have ingested some radiation and that R could affect

sperm cells. Almost three years after his exposure to

DU, Clark’s urine tested positive for uranium.

Army nurse 1st. Sgt. Carol Picou also is featured in

the NBC documentary. She and seven other women in her

medical team were in a forward position, ahead of the

main U.S. forces and surrounded by burning Iraqi tanks

and vehicles when they stopped and became exposed to

DU from the burning destroyed Iraqi armor. Doctor

Thomas Callender of Lafayette, Louisiana has examined

Picou and said on the program that her outcome bears a

striking similarity to other individuals who had

exposures to ingested radioactive elements. Picou has

been given a medical discharge.

The 7 medical personnel with Picou and the 12 soldiers

with Clark probably became contaminated with DU. These

21 soldiers are not included in the official list of

those recognized by the U.S. government as having been

exposed to DU. Given the large tonnage of uranium

penetrators; in cannon rounds that were fired on the

battlefields in Iraq and Kuwait, it is likely that

many thousands of other soldiers also became

contaminated with DU. The U.S. Army and the Department

of Veterans Affairs balk at giving urinalysis tests

and “in vivo” tests (whole-body counting of gamma

rays) to measure the amount of DU in the lungs and

other body organs of Gulf War veterans.

An astonishingly high rate of birth defects in the

families of Gulf War veterans is especially troubling.

For example, Laura Flanders reports that the Veterans

Administration conducted a state-wide survey of 251

Gulf War veterans families in Mississippi (Ref. 46).

Of their children Conceived and born since the war,

67% have illnesses rated severe or have missing eyes,

missing ears, blood infections, respiratory problems

and fused fingers. Flanders goes on to say that the

birth defects are consistent with the effects of

radiation from DU and infection from sand fly bites.

Others blame experimental vaccines, chemical warfare

pills, the insect repellent DEET and smoke from oil

well fires for causing birth defects.

Conclusion

We have shown how easily micrometer particles of DU

can spread over a large region and poison many people

both radiologically and chemically. The promotion and

sale of DU munitions by U.S. arms manu- facturers

(with U.S. government approval) and by other arms

manufacturers to the armies and air forces of many

nations will guarantee that in future conflicts

thousands of soldiers on both sides will inhale and

ingest acute doses of DU aerosols, and many in armored

vehicles stuck by DU penetrators will receive

dangerous doses of non- removable uranium shrapnel in

their bodies.

The human cost of using DU munitions in conflicts is

not worth ft perceived short-term advantages,

especially if it results in U.S. veterans and others

becoming ill and in genetic defects in their

offspring. A comprehensive epidemiological study

should be made of all Gulf War veterans and their

families, searching for evidence of residual DU in

their bodies and for causes of genetic defects in

their Children. The health issues associated with DU

munitions should be investigated and evaluated by

independent medical and scientific experts separated

completely from the Department of Defense, Department

of Veterans Affairs, National Laboratories, U.S.

military services and their contractors.

LOAD-DATE: July 1, 1997