Introduction: The Testimony of Physicist Leonard A. Dietz
By Dennis Kyne, decorated Desert Storm combat veteran, cum laude graduate of San Jose State University (1995). Dennis has testified in Hamburg, Germany, and in Japan on the effects of low-level radiation on the gene pool.
What follows is the testimony of Leonard A. Dietz, a retired physicist from the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. He submitted it to the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee in June 1997, during hearings on Gulf War Syndrome. It is technical, so here is what it says in plain terms.
When a depleted uranium (DU) round hits armor, or when DU burns, part of it turns into a fine, invisible dust of uranium oxide. Dietz explains that these particles are small enough to stay airborne for hours and travel on the wind for miles. He knew this firsthand. In 1979, he and his colleagues found DU particles in air filters as far as 26 miles from a plant in upstate New York that made DU munitions.
Once breathed in or swallowed, this dust can settle in the lungs and spread to organs and bones. It stays there, giving off radiation for years. Dietz points out that the radiation comes not only from the uranium itself but also from the elements it naturally decays into. These give off beta and gamma radiation that can pass through many body cells and damage genetic material.
Hundreds of tons of DU were fired in Kuwait and Iraq. Dietz argues that if even a small share of it burned, thousands of kilograms of this dust would have drifted over the battlefield. Unprotected troops would have breathed it in. At the time, the military’s position was that DU risks were acceptable in combat. Few veterans were ever tested.
Dietz closes by calling for a full health study of Gulf War veterans and their children. He says it should be carried out by independent scientists, completely separate from the Defense Department and the VA.
Note: This text was scanned from the original, and some typos from that process remain.
Full testimony of Leonard A. Dietz, House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, June 26, 1997.
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 5906 words
TESTIMONY June 26, 1997, LEONARD A. DIETZ
PHYSICIST AND RESEARCH SCIENTIST (RETIRED)
HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT HUMAN RESOURCES
GULF WAR SYNDROME
Contamination of Persian Gulf War Veterans and Others by Depleted Uranium
Source: Leonard A. Dietz, physicist and research scientist (retired), Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. Contamination of Persian Gulf War Veterans and Others by Depleted Uranium (July 19, 1996).
Submitted as testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on Human Resources, hearing on Gulf War Syndrome, June 26, 1997.
Originally published by the WISE Uranium Project, now at wise-uranium.org. For more on depleted uranium and the Gulf Wars, see wise-uranium.org/dissgw.html.
Shared by Dennis Kyne, Desert Storm veteran.
Abstract
We develop background information about depleted
uranium (DU) and use it to describe a physical model
of how on the battlefields in Kuwait and Iraq a large
number of unprotected Gulf War veterans could easily
have acquired dangerous quantities of DU in their
bodies.
We examine how U-238, which comprises more than 99% of
DU, decays radioactively, producing two decay progeny
that are always present with it and add significantly
to its radioactivity. The pyrophoric nature of uranium
metal causes it to bum (oxoize rapidly) when heated by
impact or in fires to form invisible aerosol particles
that become airborne.
We refer to scientific measurements that have been
made of the atmospheric wind-borne transport of
uranium aerosols over distances up to 25 miles (42 km)
from their sources. Stokes’ well-known physical law
helps to explain how airborne transport of DU
particles can occur over large distances.
We describe how gamma rays and energetic beta
particles become absorbed in body tissue and can
traverse large numbers of body calls, potentially
causing damage to genetic material in the nuclei of
living cells.
We describe a biokinetic model developed by the
International Commission on Radiation Protection that
explains how uranium microparticles can enter the body
and spread to vital organs. The model predicts that an
acute intake of uranium particles can result in
urinary excretions of uranium for years afterward.
We review estimates of the tonnage of DU munitions
fired during the Gulf War. Even it only one or two
percent of a low estimate of 300 metric tons of DU
fired burned up, this would have Produced 3000–6000 kg
of DU aerosols.
This background information allows us to propose a
plausible contamination model at a battle site. It
consists of three steps:
1. A source of hundreds of kilograms of DU aerosols
generated suddenly against concentrated Iraqi armor;
2. Widespread rapid dispersal of DU aerosol particles
by wind action;
3. Inhalation and ingestion of DU particles by
unprotected U.S. service personnel on the battlefield.
The U.S. military and its representatives claim that
DU munitions are safe, but they have not publicly
addressed health and safety issues that apply after DU
munitions have bow fired. Apparently the official view
is that in a combat situation it is acceptable for
unprotected personnel to be exposed to the combustion
products of fired DU munitions and assume any health
risks involved.
We mention that 22 U.S. service personnel have been
reported to have suffered imbedded fragments of DU in
their bodies from “friendly, fire.” More than 5 years
after the Gulf War, few of these fragments have been
removed and the long-term health situation for these
veterans has not yet been determined. We note the
astonishingly high incidence of serious birth defects
in families of Gulf War veterans in the State of
Mississippi.
Finally, we mention how commonly used DU flight
control counterweights in aircraft and DU munitions
can bum in intense tires and produce dangerous
concentrations of airborne DU aerosol particles that
can be inhaled and ingested.
Introduction
It has been reported widely in the press that numerous
Persian Gulf War veterans have become ill with with
Gulf War Syndrome. During the war they were exposed to
toxic chemicals, experimental drugs, insect repellents
and depleted uranium or DU (Ref. 1). Uranium is known
to be highly toxic both chemically and radiologically
(Ref. 2).
It has not yet been determined to what degree DU may
have caused their illnesses and genetic detects in
their children conceived and born after the war. Few
veterans were aware that DU munitions were used until
after they were exposed to uranium and became ill.
Some were told about the gamma emission from DU but no
one was told about the health dangers of inhaling tine
particles of uranium oxide dust generated when a DU
penetrator hits armor (Ref. 3). Eight days after the
shooting stopped, a directive from Army Headquarters
gave the first instructions to troops on how to treat
radioactively contaminated vehicles (Ref. 4).
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a
physical model of how easily marry Gulf War veterans
could have acquired dangerous quantities of DU in
their bodies. To accomplish this we review the
pyrophoric nature of uranium metal and its
radioactivity. We show how readily uranium aerosol
dust can be transported great distances by wind action
in the atmosphere, pathways that DU aerosol particles
can take into the body and become absorbed, and the
tonnage of DU munitions fired during the Gulf War.
This information is used to construct a contamination
model that explains how large numbers of soldiers very
likely became contaminated on the battlefields in
Kuwait and Iraq. We show how the U.S. military views
the safety of DU munitions, and we close by mentioning
some of the known exposures of U.S. soldiers to DU and
noting the high percentage of severe birth defects in
children conceived and born in many families of Gulf
War veterans.
The Pyrophoric Nature of Uranium Metal
The pyrophoric nature of uranium metal is well known
(Re. 2, Rel. 5). An estimate used by U.S. Army field
commanders is that when a DU penetrator in a cannon
round is fired at high velocity against armor, about
10% of R bums up and forms micrometer-size uranium
oxide particles that can be inhaled or ingested (Ref.
6). However, a report by the Army Environmental Policy
Institute (AEPI) describing research an hard target
testing states “As much as 70 percent of a DU
penetrator can be aerosolized when it strikes a tank.
..” (Ref. 7).
Uranium can burn in other ways to generate aerosol
particles of uranium oxide. Because elemental uranium
is pyrophoric, when DU metal is heated in air at a
temperature of 500 deg. C it can oxidize rapidly and
sustain slow combustion (Ref. 5). For example the
effects of fires at storage sites for DU munitions
have been studied (Rot. 8). The burning of DU metal
flight control counterweights at airplane crash sites
and the possibility of exposing large numbers of
people to kidney poisoning (nephrotoxicity) by uranium
oxide particles has been studied by Parker (Ref. 9).
In 1992 an B Al Boeing-747 crashed into an apartment
building in Amsterdam, Holland and burned intensely.
Approximately 273 kg of DU in the tail of the 747 is
unaccounted for; it burned and contaminated the
surrounding area (Ref. 10).
Radioactive Decay of Uranium
We look briefly at the uranium decay series. Table I
summarizes the isotopic composition of natural and
depleted uranium. The isotopic compositions were
measured in highly sensitive and accurate mass
spectrometers at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
(Ref. 11).
Table I. isotopic composition of natural and
depleted uranium in
atom percent.
U-234 U-235 U-236
U-238
Natural Uranium 0.0055 0.7196 0.0000
99–2749
Depleted Uranium 0.0008 0.2015 0.0030
99–7947
A trace of U-236 from reprocessed nuclear fuel may be
present in some of the DU stockpile. The alpha
activity in DU is about 431% less than it is in
natural uranium because there is km U-234 and U-235,
but DU always occurs in highly concentrated form and
this more than makes up for its lower alpha activity.
In contrast, natural uranium occurs in concentrations
of 1–3 parts per million by weight in soils, where it
is locked up in non-metallic form in minerals and is
relatively inert to chemical action there.
Only the first three isotopes in the uranium decay
series or chain headed by U-238 are important in
determining the radioactivity of DU (Ref. 12).
Uranium-238 decays into thorium-234 (Th-234), which
decays into protactinium-234 (Pa-234), which decays
into U-234, etc. down the decay chain. The 246,000
year half life of U-234 is too long for it to decay
much during our lifetimes and produce significant
numbers of decay progeny.
The U-238 decay chain is broken during the chemical
reduction of uranium hexafluoride into DU metal and is
broken again during the melting and processing of the
metal into a penetration To determine the maximum time
it takes to regain equilibrium in the partial decay
chain, we assume a solid sample of uranium that
initially contains only the U,-238 isotope, i.e. no
decay progeny. Using Bateman’s equations, (Ref. 13).
we calculate the growth of Th-234 and Pa-234
activities as a function of elapsed time in weeks. The
results are given in Table II.
Table II. Radioactivity (disintegrations/second)
in I gram of U-
238 with no decay progeny initially present. Hag
lives used: U-238 =
4.47e9 years; Th-234 = 24.10 days; Pa-234 =1.17
minutes, 6.69 hours
(two decay states); U-234 = 2.4695 years (Ref — 14).
Scientific
notation is used, i.e. 2.46e5 = 246000.
Weeks U-238 -> Th-234 -> Pa-234 -> U-234
0 12,430 0 0 0.000
1 12,430 2,270 2,150 0.000
5 12,430 7,890 7,840 0.001
10 12,430 10,770 10,750 0.004
15 12,430 11,830 1,820 0.007
20 12,430 12,210 12,210 0.010
25 12,430 12,350 12,350 0.013
30 12,430 12,400 12,400 0.017
After 25 weeks, Th-234 and Pa-234 have reached 99.4%
of the decay rate of U-238 and for practical purposes
have reached secular equilibrium with U-238, their
parent isotope. Secular equilibrium means that the
decay progeny of U-238 are being replaced at the same
rate they are decaying; attar 25 weeks ail three
isotopes are decaying at approximately the same rate.
This is a maximum time; in reality, equilibrium will
be readied much taster, since these two isotopes can
never be separated totally from U-238. The isotope
U-238 emits alpha particles and also emits some gamma
rays. Its decay progeny Th-234 and Pa-234 each emit
beta particles and gamma rays. An alpha particle is a
fast helium am with its two elections removed, a beta
particle is a high-speed electronic and a gamma ray is
like an X-ray.
From this analysis we conclude that in solid sample of
DU, six months at most after manufacture of a DU
penetrator, or DU armor for a tank, or DU particles in
a person’s body, substantial additional radiation in
the form of beta particles and gamma rays always win
be present. In fact, most of the penetrating gamma
radiation and all of the penetrating beta radiation
from DU comes, not from uranium, but from the decay
progeny of U-238 (Ref. 15). In a year, only one-
thousandth of a gram (1 milligram or mg) of DU
generates more than a billion alpha particles, beta
particles and gamma rays.
The U.S. Army has investigated the generation of DU
aerosol in armored vehicles hit by DU cannon rounds.
Their investigators report …that personnel inside DU
stuck vehicles could receive a dose in the ‘tens of
milligrams’ range due to inhalation” (Ref. 16). This
exposure results in an acute dose of uranium.
Gamma rays become absorbed in body tissue as follows.
If their energy exceeds 40 keV, part of the gamma-ray
energy is transferred to an atomic electron, selling
it in high-speed motion (1 keV = 1000 electron volts
energy). The remaining energy is carried off by a new
gamma ray. This process, called the Compton effect,
repeats until the gamma ray has an energy below about
40 keV where the photoelectric effect dominates and
the remaining energy can be transferred to a
photoelectron.
For example, using Gofman’s method,(Ref. 17) one can
calculate that an 850 keV gamma ray absorbed in body
tissue will produce a packet of high-speed Compton
electrons and a fast photolectron that on average can
traverse 137 body calls. BY contrast, according to
Gofman, X-rays commonly used in medical diagnosis have
a peak energy of 90 keV and an average energy of 30
keV (Bet. 17) A 30 keV X-ray in body tissue can be
converted into a photoelectron of this energy, which
on average can traverse only 1.7 calls. Ionization
along the tracks of high-speed electrons in tissue can
cause damage to genetic material in the nuclei of
cells.
Thus, a high energy gamma ray from Pa-234 is much more
penetrating than a typical medical X-ray and can
damage tar more living cells. The many 2.29 MeV beta
particles emitted by Pa-234 are extremely penetrating
in body tissue (1 MeV = I million election volts
energy). Referring to the experimental data given by
Gofman (Ref. 17), each one of these beta particles can
traverse more than 500 body calls.
Alpha, beta and gamma radiations produce the same
biological effects on cells and organs, and much of
their radiation damage to body tissue can accumulate
over the time of exposure (Ref. 18). Therefore, it
seems reasonable that not only to continuous radiation
of body tissue by alpha particles from U-238, but the
energetic beta particles and gamma rays from its decay
progeny Th-234 and Pa-234 must also be considered when
assessing possible cancer risk and genetic damage.
Airborne Transport of Uranium Particles
The fallout range of airborne DU aerosol dust is
virtually unlimited. These micro-particles can be
Inhaled and ingested easily and that makes them
dangerous to human health. Environmental assessments
for sites which process DU or test tire DU munitions
typically downplay the potential for widespread
fallout of DU particles.
For example, one such environmental impact study in
1992 by the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory
(Ref. 19) states, “Because of the mass and density of
the DU particle, it only travels short distances when
airborne. These two factors alone preclude the
off-site release of DU.” This is not true for
micrometer size particles at uranium metal or its
oxides. In tact, the transport of airborne DU aerosol
particles was well known long before the Army
Ballistics Research Laboratory environmental impact
study was written, since in 1976 it had been measured
up to a distance of 8 km (Ref. 20). What my not have
been fully appreciated in 1976 was that DU aerosol
particles could be transported by wind action over
much greater distances.
In 1979 the author worked at the Knolls Atomic Power
Laboratory (KAPL) in Schenectady, New York. While
trouble shooting a radiological problem, he and his
colleagues in the mass spectrometer component
accidentally discovered DU aerosols collected in
environmental air filters exposed at the Knolls site
(Ref. 21). The origin of the DU contamination proved
to be the National Lead Industries plant in Colonie,
10 miles (16 km) east of the Knolls site, on the
western boundary of the city of Albany, NY. A local
newspaper reported that NL was fabricating DU
penetrators for 30-mm cannon rounds and airplane
counterweights made of DU metal (Ref. 22).
A total of 16 air filters at three different locations
covering 25 weeks of exposure from May through October
of 1979 were analyzed; all contained trace amounts of
DU. Three of these air filters were exposed for four
weeks each at a site 26 miles (42 km) northwest of the
NL plant. This is by no means the maximum fallout
distance for DU aerosol particles.
Totally unrelated to the discovery of DU in KAPL air
filters, in February 1980, a court order by NY State
forced NL to cease production, because they exceeded a
NY State radioactivity limit of 150 microcuries for
airborne emissions in a given month (Ref. 22). The
plant closed in 1983 and is now being decontaminated
and dismantled. The 150 microcuries corresponds to 387
g of DU metal. For comparison, one GAU-8/A penetrator
in an aircraft 30-mm cannon round contains 272 g of DU
metal (Ref. 5).
Using a special fission track analysis technique, 26
uranium- bearing particles were extracted from several
air filters exposed at KAPL and were analyzed
separately for their uranium isotopic content (Ref.
11) Four particles contained pure DU. They were
approximately 4- 6 micrometers in size, three were
irregularly shaped and the fourth was a 3.8 micrometer
diameter sphere. Probably it solidified from a molten
state as uranium dioxide. The other 22 particles were
enriched uranium associated with the radiological
troubleshooting problem.
This widespread trace contamination of DU in the
atmosphere was less than one percent of allowable
limits. Its presence in the air filters did not
concern us nearly as much as the sizes of the DU
particles that were born ten miles by the wind from
Albany to KAPL. The four DU particles were near the
upper and of the respirable size range, which is about
5 micrometers. Respirable means that particles will
pass through the upper respiratory airway to the lung
and become deposited in various interior regions of
the king, where many will remain for many years. A 5
micrometer uranium dioxide particle can cause a high,
localized yearly radiation dose from energetic alpha
particles to lung tissue; it is a radioactive hot spot
in the king (Ref. 23).
The density of uranium metal is 19 grams per cubic
centimeter; for uranium dioxide it is 11 grams per
cubic centimeter, equal to the density of lead. How
can a uranium dioxide particle with this density, or a
uranium metal particle with a density 1.7 times that
of lead remain airborne long enough to be transported
by wind 26 miles (42 km)? It might seem a daunting
challenge to answer this question, but a complicated
physical theory is unnecessary.
Just as a parachute jumper in a tree tall through the
lower atmosphere quickly reaches a constant terminal
velocity of approximately 120 mph, so too a
micrometer-size uranium particle falling under
gravitational attraction through still air will reach
a constant terminal velocity that is determined by its
size, density, geometrical shape and air viscosity.
Stokes’ law provides an accurate and convincing
scientific explanation of how micrometer-size DU
particles can remain airborne for many hours. This
physical law is well known to scientists and engineers
who study fluid dynamics. It was published in 1846 and
1851 by Sir George Stokes, and is described in
introductory textbooks on fluid flow (Ref. 24). It is
given by the expression Charter Deleted where
9C
R¬2 means R squared,
G= 980.4 centimeters per second squared is the
acceleration of gravity,
R = the radius of the sphere in centimeters,
S = the density of the sphere in grams per cubic
centimeter,
A = 1.213e-3 grams per cubic centimeter is to density
of air at one atmosphere and 18 dog. C,
C = 1.827e-4 poise is the viscosity of air at one
atmosphere and 18 deg. C.
The terminal velocity V is in centimeters per second
if G, R, S, A and C are in the units shown. Stokes’
law allows one to calculate the terminal velocity of a
microsphere of uranium metal or uranium oxide of known
radius and density falling through still air.
Stokes’ law is valid for fluid flow described by a
Reynolds number of 0. 1 or less (Ref. 24). Experiments
confirm this upper limit (Ref. 25) The dimensionless
Reynolds number Re for a sphere is given by 2 RAV,
Re =
C
where the terms are defined above. A 10 micrometer
diameter uranium metal sphere falls at 5.7 cm/sec in
still air and Re = 0.038, which is much less than 0.1.
Therefore, Stokes’ law is accurate for WI respirable
spherical uranium metal or oxide particles 10
micrometers or less in diameter failing through air.
Table III fists the fall rates for a range of particle
sizes.
Table III. Terminal (constant) velocities for
uranium dioxide
spherical particles in still air.
Diameters are in micrometers.
dia cm/sec. ft/hr.
5.0 0.82 97
4.0 0.52 62
3.0 0.30 35
2.0 0.13 15
1.0 0.033 4
0.5 0.0082 1
Irregularly-shaped microparticiles will fall more
slowly than a sphere of the same density and weight.
Depleted uranium particles one micrometer or smaller
are virtually floating in air and can remain airborne
for a very long time. The 3.8 micrometer dia.
spherical uranium dioxide particle analyzed at KAPL
had a fall rate of 56 ft./hr. It had to reach a height
of only 200 ft. in the warm exhaust plume from the
National Lead plant for a gentle breeze averaging 3
mph to carry it 10 miles (16 km) to KAPL.
Fallout range can be increased greatly by two more
natural phenomena. First, frictional forces in the air
or emission of an alpha particle from a uranium atom
wig electrostatically charge a DU particle. For
example, N is well known that a high velocity ion
striking a metal oxide surface will dislodge a pulse
of secondary electrons from the surface (Ref. 26).
An alpha particle is a high velocity helium ion, and
it will generate a large number of secondary electrons
below the surface of an uranium oxide particle as it
passes through the surface. Many of the
momentarily-free electrons just below the surface will
escape from an airborne uranium oxide particle,
leaving it in a positively- charged state.
Like an electrostatic precipitator collecting dust in
a room, an electrically-charged uranium dioxide
particle and an oppositely- charged dust particle will
attract each other and join together. The average
density of the two particles together will be
substantially less than 11 grams per cubic centimeter
and the fallout range will be greatly increased.
Fallout particles of DU also can become attached to
sand or dust particles on the ground and then become
resuspended in the air by wind or vehicle action and
transported to new locations (Ref. 27). Desert sand in
the Persian Gulf region is extremely fine (Ref. 28).
Second, random motions of the atmosphere of a few
cm/sec are of the same order of magnitude as the
terminal velocities of micrometer particles of DU
oxide or metal tailing through air.
Pathways of DU and Its Radiations Into the Body
Routes of intake or pathways of uranium particles into
the body include the respiratory tract, the
gastrointestinal tract and the skin, through abrasions
or wounds. The International Commission on Radiation
Protection (ICRP) has developed a biokenetic model
that describes the behavior of uranium within the
human body (Ref. 29). The model takes into account
aerosol particle size, chemical form, and the
excretion rates of absorbed uranium from individual
vital organs and bones. Radioactive particles reach
the gastrointestinal tract by ingestion and by
transfer from the respiratory tract. The model shows
that for an acute intake of uranium aerosol particles
of uranium dioxide or U308, urinary excretion of the
inhaled uranium can continue for years.
Exposure to gamma rays emitted from DU is another
pathway into the body. Crews are exposed to the
equivalent of one chest X-ray for every 20–30 hours
they spend in an Abrams tank armed with DU ammunition
(Ref. 30). The U.S. Army measured a gamma dose rate of
250 millirems per hour at the surface of a penetrator
(Ref. 31). This dose rate is consistent with the 233
millirads per hour dose rate for an unspecified mass
of DU listed on a U.S. Department of Labor Material
Safety Data Sheet issued to Nuclear Metals, Inc. (Ref.
32). For gamma rays, the rad and rem dose units are
equal. At body contact, the 250 millirems per hour is
equivalent to a dose rate of up to approximately 50
chest X — rays per hour. Whole penetrators or large
fragments of penetrators fired from tank cannon and
left on a battlefield have this amount of surface
radioactivity.
Estimates of Tonnage of DU Munitions Fired
The actual tonnage of DU munitions tired during the
Gulf War is difficult to ascertain. During the war all
battlefield news was censored and the expenditure of
DU by A-10 attack aircraft was classified (Rot. 33).
It has been estimated that these aircraft fired about
950/6 of the DU munitions used during Desert Shield
and Desert Storm (Ref. 34). The U.S. Army now claim
(Ref. 35) that “More than 14,000 large caliber DU
rounds were consumed during Operations Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. As many as 7,000 of these rounds
may have been fired in practice. Approximately 4,000
rounds were reportedly fired in combat. The remaining
3,000 rounds are losses that include a substantial
loss in a fire at Doha, Kuwait.
The 14,000 rounds contained about 60 metric tons of
DU. William Arkin estimates from documents released
under the Freedom of Information Act that
approximately 300 metric tons of DU littered the
battlefields of Kuwait and Iraq after the war (Ref.
34). The LAKA Foundation estimates the total as SM
tons (Ref. 36). Allowing for DU projectiles missing
their targets, even it only one or two percent of the
lower estimate of 300 metric tons burned up, then
3,000,000- 6,000,000 grams of DU aerosol particles
could have become airborne over the battlefields -a
huge amount.
Contamination Model
We can now propose a plausible model of how veterans
became contaminated with DU during the Gulf War. It
consists of a sequence of three steps:
1. Source-in a local area of a battlefield, hundreds
of kilograms of micrometer-size DU particles were
generated suddenly by cannon fire from U.S. airplanes
and tanks at concentrated formations of Iraqi armor.
Thermal columns from burning tanks and vehicles then
carried aloft these localized plumes of DU aerosol
particles.
2. Dispersal-Clouds of DU aerosol particles were
dispersed far and wide by wind action over the
battlefield arid, based on the KAPL measurements, the
fallout range of these uranium micro-particles could
be tip to 25 miles (42 km) or more (Ref. 11).
3. Inhalation and Ingestion-unprotected U.S. service
personnel could inhale and ingest huge numbers of DU
particles into their lungs and bodies, where much of
the DU could become absorbed in vital organs and
bones. The ICRP biokinetic model explains how uranium
aerosol particles can enter the body and become
absorbed (Ref. 29).
The U.S. Army and the Department of Veterans Affairs
have shown an unwillingness to investigate health
issues associated with the toxicity and radioactivity
of inhaled and ingested DU aerosol particles that have
become absorbed in the body. Both have refused to test
large numbers of veterans for the presence of DU in
their bodies; so far only a handful have been tested.
According to Laura Flanders, as of January, 1995, at
least 45,000 soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf
during the war are suffering from symptoms connected
with their service (Ref. 37).
Workers in DU industrial processing plants and people
living in communities surrounding these plants also
have been contaminated by fallout of DU particles
(Ref. 22). How rapidly contamination takes place
depends on the magnitude of the airborne concentration
and particle size of the uranium dust. The smaller the
particle, the easier R can enter the body.
In written testimony prepared for a 1982 New York
State hearing on NL Industries, Dr. Cad Johnson, a
principal investigator of the National Cancer
Institute Project, stated that some of the workers at
the NL plant had concentrations of uranium in their
urine as high as 30 picocuries/liter (77 micrograms of
urank/liter). He said this concentration level
indicated a very heavy body burden of uranium (Ref -
38).
How the U.S. Military Views the Safety of DU Munitions
In a letter to Senator Sam Nunn, a representative of
the U.S. Air Force stated, “..these Projectiles are no
more hazardous to store, transport, or employ than
those composed of lead or copper’ (Ref. 39). This view
is echoed in the U.S. Army report to Congress that
states, “The health risks associated with using DU in
peacetime are minimal. This includes risks associated
with transporting, storing and handling intact DU
munitions and affnor during peacetime” (Ref — 40).
Neither the Air Force nor the Army has publicly
presented an analysis of the health risks to soldiers
and to others who inhale or ingest radioactive fallout
particles of DU, or the health risks of living in an
environment contaminated with DU after these munitions
have been fired-these are the real safety issues they
ignore. Furthermore, a General Accounting Office
report to Congress states, “…Army officials believe
that DU protective methods can be ignored during
battle and other life-threatening situations because
DU-related health risks are greatly outweighed by the
risks of combat” (Ref. 41).
The Army must know that it would be extremely
difficult to provide breathing masks that can
efficiently remove all of the respirable DU particles
from air breathed by soldiers. Even it highly
efficient air titters are used by troops, their
surroundings will still be contaminated. The surface
of the ground, vegetation, equipment, uniforms and
other garments contaminated with DU particles will
become secondary sources of airborne DU aerosols
whenever they are disturbed or moved, thereby
presenting an insurmountable radiological containment
and decontamination problem on the battlefield.
In the AEPI report, (Ref. 42) the Army judges it an
acceptable risk it its personnel become exposed in an
unprotected fashion to the combustion products of
fired DU munitions on the battlefield or elsewhere.
This report contains much technical information about
DU, but many of the assertions and conclusions in the
report are not supported by the technical and
scientific data presented. A rebuttal to the AEPI
report pointing out some major inconsistencies in the
Army report has been published by the Military Toxics
Project (Ref. 43).
Exposure of U.S. Soldiers and Illnesses in Their
Families
Thirty-six U.S. soldiers, including 22 with embedded
fragments of DU in their bodies, have sought or
reported for medical treatment (Ref. 44). They were in
vehicles hit by DU munitions. Another report states
there were 35 casualties and 72 wounded in crews of
U.S. tanks and Bradley Fighting vehicles in so-called
“friendly fire” incidents (Ref. 45). This includes the
36 above and is the total number of service personnel
officially admitted to have been exposed to
significant quantifies of DU aerosol dust and DU
fragments during the fighting.
On an NBC Dateline program, (Ref. 6) Sgt. Daryll Clark
describes how he and twelve others were in an advanced
position in the desert when someone radioed them that
20 Iraqi tanks were approaching his forward radar unit
He called for air support, and shortly a flight of
A-10 Warthogs arrived and destroyed all of the tanks
with DU-Upped 30- mm cannon rounds.
Clark describes how he and the men with him were
coughing and choking on smoke from the burning tanks,
but mixed with R was DU aerosol dust which he and the
others breathed. He has had chronic respiratory
problems since the war and his daughter Kennedy was
born in September 1992 with purple welts called
hemangioma covering not only her face and body, but
some internal organs as well. Kennedy has serious
breathing problems and was born without a thyroid.
Clark stated that a geneticist told him that he could
have ingested some radiation and that R could affect
sperm cells. Almost three years after his exposure to
DU, Clark’s urine tested positive for uranium.
Army nurse 1st. Sgt. Carol Picou also is featured in
the NBC documentary. She and seven other women in her
medical team were in a forward position, ahead of the
main U.S. forces and surrounded by burning Iraqi tanks
and vehicles when they stopped and became exposed to
DU from the burning destroyed Iraqi armor. Doctor
Thomas Callender of Lafayette, Louisiana has examined
Picou and said on the program that her outcome bears a
striking similarity to other individuals who had
exposures to ingested radioactive elements. Picou has
been given a medical discharge.
The 7 medical personnel with Picou and the 12 soldiers
with Clark probably became contaminated with DU. These
21 soldiers are not included in the official list of
those recognized by the U.S. government as having been
exposed to DU. Given the large tonnage of uranium
penetrators; in cannon rounds that were fired on the
battlefields in Iraq and Kuwait, it is likely that
many thousands of other soldiers also became
contaminated with DU. The U.S. Army and the Department
of Veterans Affairs balk at giving urinalysis tests
and “in vivo” tests (whole-body counting of gamma
rays) to measure the amount of DU in the lungs and
other body organs of Gulf War veterans.
An astonishingly high rate of birth defects in the
families of Gulf War veterans is especially troubling.
For example, Laura Flanders reports that the Veterans
Administration conducted a state-wide survey of 251
Gulf War veterans families in Mississippi (Ref. 46).
Of their children Conceived and born since the war,
67% have illnesses rated severe or have missing eyes,
missing ears, blood infections, respiratory problems
and fused fingers. Flanders goes on to say that the
birth defects are consistent with the effects of
radiation from DU and infection from sand fly bites.
Others blame experimental vaccines, chemical warfare
pills, the insect repellent DEET and smoke from oil
well fires for causing birth defects.
Conclusion
We have shown how easily micrometer particles of DU
can spread over a large region and poison many people
both radiologically and chemically. The promotion and
sale of DU munitions by U.S. arms manu- facturers
(with U.S. government approval) and by other arms
manufacturers to the armies and air forces of many
nations will guarantee that in future conflicts
thousands of soldiers on both sides will inhale and
ingest acute doses of DU aerosols, and many in armored
vehicles stuck by DU penetrators will receive
dangerous doses of non- removable uranium shrapnel in
their bodies.
The human cost of using DU munitions in conflicts is
not worth ft perceived short-term advantages,
especially if it results in U.S. veterans and others
becoming ill and in genetic defects in their
offspring. A comprehensive epidemiological study
should be made of all Gulf War veterans and their
families, searching for evidence of residual DU in
their bodies and for causes of genetic defects in
their Children. The health issues associated with DU
munitions should be investigated and evaluated by
independent medical and scientific experts separated
completely from the Department of Defense, Department
of Veterans Affairs, National Laboratories, U.S.
military services and their contractors.
LOAD-DATE: July 1, 1997
